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EPILOGUE
THE STATUTE OF ANNE:
TODAY AND TOMORROW'
PeterJaszi
CraigJoyce
MarshallLeaffer***
Tyler Ochoa*
By the time you read these few concluding observations, the
time for celebrating the 300th Anniversary of the Statute of
Anne will have come-but not gone! While the official
commemoration of this momentous event in copyright history
was April 10, 2010, the importance of the Statute of Anne-as a
measure for where copyright has been, what it has become, and
what it may yet be-continues.
In 1710 (had anyone given the point any thought), the
likelihood that this newly-minted statutory scheme would
someday assume an important position in the corpus juris could
not have seemed very high. Essentially, the first copyright act
represented a modest regulatory response to a specialized social
problem of less than earth-shaking proportions: the growing
insecurity of capital investments in the burgeoning London-based
publishing business. Many means might have been chosen to
address this problem. In fact, Parliament elected to stabilize the
market in printed books by recognizing a portable legal right in
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texts which vested initially in their creators, while
acknowledging the existence of a "public interest" in access to
information. These elections, as we know, proved to be fateful.
Unbeknownst to its members, the Parliament of 1710 managed
to invent a formula which has been flexible enough to serve as
the primary vehicle for nearly three centuries of legal responses
to changes in the way information is made, stored, sold, and
used.
Considered as a whole, the history of Anglo-American
copyright law has been a remarkable one, driven, in significant
part, by the waves of innovation in information technology that
are a hallmark of the late modern period. But the relationship
between ever-accelerating technological progress and the
development of copyright doctrine has not been simple.
Technology itself does not drive the development of copyright
law. Rather, copyright is driven by the changes in social life,
economic organization, and cultural outlook that technology
inspires. To complicate the pattern further, copyright law has
helped to shape these changes, even as it has been shaped by
them.
In the United States at least, where the basic framework of
law laid down by the Statute of Anne has persisted the longest,
the story of copyright now has entered a new era-one in which
this body of law is being remade more radically and more rapidly
than at any other point in its history. In retrospect, at least, we
can see the process of law revision which began in the early
1960s and culminated in the Copyright Act of 1976 2 -a tectonic
shifting of the plates-as the crucial episode in the modern
transformation of copyright, paving the way for future efforts at
harmonization and the development of international norms. But
if the 1976 Act represented a critical reconsideration of historic
theory and practice in this branch of the law, events since the
Act took effect in 1978 have been even more dramatic-and
those of the next decade may be even more so. Today, copyright
law is subject to extraordinary new pressures. As never before,
the globalization of information commerce has subjected U.S.
copyright law to a variety of external forces, including
international legal norms and the ideological influences of foreign
laws of literary and artistic property. Meanwhile, copyright law
is being pressed to adapt to the new rehlities of the digital
condition-and to do so without the delay associated with its past
accommodations to technological developments. What can be
2. Act of Oct. 19, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (effective Jan. 1, 1978)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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guessed, then, about the vectors of change along which these
pressures will direct the law of copyright in years to come?
To frame

the speculations

that

follow,'

it

may

be

worthwhile to point out that, although U.S. copyright always
has had many features in common with the analogous laws of
other countries, it also has maintained a somewhat distinct
identity, not least where thinking about goals and purposes is
concerned. Like all laws of literary and artistic property, ours
has been affected by a deep-seated vision of inherent authorial
entitlement. Unlike most other national laws, however, U.S.
copyright has not developed primarily from a discourse
dominated by that vision. Instead, the discussion of copyright
policy in the United States has been characterized largely, at
least for most of its history, by a shared rhetoric of public
purpose. Like the laws of other countries which inherited the
British legal tradition, U.S. copyright law is explicitly premised
on a vision in which grants of information monopolies to
individuals are rationalized as incentives to the creation and
distribution of information for the benefit of all. Unlike some
other national laws rooted in the Statute of Anne, U.S.
copyright has remained overtly faithful to that vision. Put
differently, U.S. copyright law has been conceived as an
instrument of national cultural policy, rather than a mere
scheme of private rights. From its inception, it has been the
vehicle for the balancing of private proprietary claims and the
public interest in access to information resources.
The concept of purpose just described has been of more than
merely rhetorical significance. Where copyright doctrine is
concerned, it has had an important generative influence. It
explains the "limited Times" language of the constitutional
Copyright Clause. It helps account for the historical commitment
of U.S. copyright law to the various "formalities" that formed
part of the public price that rights holders were expected to pay
for their private privileges. And it informs many of the most
characteristic and distinct features of U.S. law as it stands
today, including its insistence on the exclusion of protection for
factual and governmental information and its broad conception
of a residual "fair use" exception to claims of copyright
infringement.
Intimately related to U.S. copyright's special vision of
purpose (and its cognate doctrinal peculiarities) is its unusual

3. For detailed discussion of the matters that follow, with citations to pertinent
statutory provisions and case law, see generally JOYCE, supra note 1.
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position of primacy in the field of information law. As we know,
copyright shares the field of federal intellectual property with
other bodies of rules. Where proprietary rights and use privileges
in intangible expression are concerned, however, it stands more
or less entirely alone. Until very recently indeed, Congress had
not seen fit to enact any "neighboring rights" legislation of the
sort that is common abroad, displaying instead a positive
antipathy toward the notion of specialized protections of lesser
scope and duration than those afforded by copyright. In the
United States, policy choices regarding the recognition of federal
proprietary rights for new forms of expression historically have
been framed in quite singular fashion: protection under copyright
or no protection at all. Similarly, the preemption doctrine has
kept the underbrush of state laws relating to rights in
information under fairly rigorous check. In the United States,
then, copyright law consistently has represented more than a
mere set of default rules for interest-balancing in the domain of
cultural production. Instead, it has represented the definitive
expression of a collective social judgment about what forms such
balancing should take.
The preceding paragraphs represent an effort to articulate
the basis for our persistent sense of the "special character" of
U.S. copyright law. It is precisely those features of the law,
however, which have been under pressure for most of the last
half-century and are under ever-increasing pressure today. The
next decade or so of developments will provide at least a
tentative answer to this question, among others: As we enter the
fourth century of statutory copyright law, what remains of the
special copyright tradition, first engendered by the Statute of
Anne, of which the United States is arguably the preeminent
inheritor?
Imagine a Rip Van Winkle of intellectual property (or,
indeed, Good Queen Anne herself!), who dozed off in 1710, only to
awaken three centuries later, in 2010. How easily would he (or
she) recognize copyright doctrine-or copyright discourse-in this
tri-centennial year? And if the answer is "only with difficulty,"
does it really matter?
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Rip Van Winkle
Bettmann / CORBIS

Where copyright doctrine is concerned, U.S. law has been
substantially remade by the Copyright Act of 1976, subsequent
legislative revisions, and the explosive growth of copyright case
law. That process of revision is likely to continue unabated in the
decade to come. Of course, some of the most peculiar-even
anomalous-features of U.S. copyright doctrine are unlikely to be
displaced. The work-for-hire doctrine, for example, represents too
great a convenience to corporate copyright owners to be lightly
discarded (although U.S. efforts to persuade the rest of the world
to adopt or at least defer to it have been less than wholly
successful).
In other respects, however, our sleeper would be in for a
rude awakening. Getting over his first shock at the sheer volume
and density of our increasingly muscle-bound (and consequently
inflexible) copyright statute, with all its new, exquisitely
qualified specialized provisions, he might reflect on the end of the
dream of a "unified field" theory of copyright. Almost certainly,
he would marvel at the range of new subject matter categories
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(including "works" resolutely unintelligible to the ordinary
information consumer)-as well as the proliferation of "rights"
and the reflexive growth in the complexity and sophistication of
infringement analysis. Likewise, he might note the remarkable
punitive turn reflected in the trend toward the criminalization of
copyright remedies and the decoupling of civil remedies from
ideas of actual harm and benefit. But of all the intervening
developments, perhaps none would appear as so dramatic a
break with the past as the unseating of "publication" as the
triggering event for the attachment of copyright and the
enthronement of "fixation" in its place-the "big bang" of 1978, by
which the copyright universe expanded to embrace our private
letters, laundry lists, and doodles, as well as our undying literary
and artistic effusions.
Presumably, changes in the calculus of copyright termincluding, in particular, the life-plus-70 regime-also would come
as a surprise to our newly awakened sleeper. Even more
surprising, one suspects, would be the breach of the once-axiomatic
principle that a work once in the public domain should remain in
the public domain-a principle set aside in 1994 where various
works of foreign origin are concerned and perhaps to be
challenged, in due course, with respect to domestic works as well.
The familiar ( notice might seem to offer a comfortingly
stable point of reference when the sleeper wakes. But when he
inspected it more closely, that sense of comfort would be likely to
fade with the realization that copyright formalities are not what
they used to be. And while the fair use doctrine-that monument
to the singularity of U.S. copyright law-still looms large over
the much changed landscape of copyright in 2010, an attentive
listener can hear rumblings emanating from the growing
influence of the "three-part test" of TRIPS Article 13.
Extrapolation from today's situation suggests that, whatever
the changes in doctrine, copyright discourse in the teen years of the
twenty-first century may be even more dramatically different than
those produced by the decades just past. Hearing longer, stronger
protection justified in microeconomic terms, as promoting the
efficient allocation of information resources, and the public
domain derided as a wasteland of abandoned interests, our
sleeper might wonder what had become of the once-dominant
notion of a "public-private bargain" at the heart of copyright.
Likewise, he probably would be struck by the continuing viability
of the rhetoric of "misappropriation"-once associated only with
various obscure and suspect state-law doctrines-in mainstream
discussions of copyright itself. He would be moved to wonder how
limitations and exceptions to copyright, seen in his time as a fully

2010]1

EPILOGUE

1019

integrated part of the distribution of rights and privileges in the
overall copyright system, could now be widely characterized as
burdens or impositions on the rights of owners. And he would be
puzzled to hear so much said about the centrality of copyright to
the U.S. foreign balance of payments and to the welfare of
information-owning corporations-and so little about its
importance in the working lives of individual creators.
It seems entirely possible, however, that the greatest surprise
of all might be the gathering demise of copyright's historical-and
sometimes splendid-isolation. In the not-too-distant future, for
example, it is reasonable to expect renewed pressure for federal
database protection legislation outside copyright law, extending
protection under a Commerce Clause-based scheme of
neighboring rights to precisely the subject matter that the
decision in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Company, Inc.4 marked as out-of-bounds for copyright. Still other
forms of sui generis protection may emerge, including
comprehensive registration-based protection for designs excluded
from copyright on account of their utility-following the path
blazed by the introduction of rights for boat hulls in 1998. Even
today, various state-law doctrines, such as the "right of
publicity," are giving copyright a run for its money, while enjoying
widespread immunity from preemption. Our waking sleeper could
live to see a world in which "shrink-wrap" and "click-through"
licenses, enforceable under state laws, have reduced the norms of
copyright to an easily overridden "default setting" where the
distribution of works in digital formats is concerned!
Already, under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act,
information use is regulated by elaborate systems of
"technological safeguards," themselves backed up by the new
non-copyright provisions of Title 17 imposing various pains and
penalties on those who circumvent them or enable their
circumvention. Indeed, our sleeper would be waking to an
unforeseen world in which information consumers are required to
secure licenses for more and more uses of proprietary content, no
matter how trivial in amount and no matter how fully justified in
terms of traditional copyright categories such as fair use. It is
something of a paradox that, in such a brave new world, the best
hopes for safeguarding a vestige of a "public interest" in access to
information may lie outside copyright itself, in the doctrines of
competition law which today are beginning to impinge on
intellectual property.

4.

Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
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However the just-sketched scenario of copyright's possible
"marginalization" plays out, it is clear today that-in yet
another sense-the historic isolation of U.S. copyright law
already is a thing of the past. Whether we locate the decisive
shift in 1891 (passage of the Chace Act)' or 1988 (U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention),6 the United States now is
enmeshed irrevocably with the larger world where copyright is
concerned-and copyright itself is no longer an independent
category in the international legal order in this post-TRIPS era.
In years to come, we will hear more calls to revise domestic
copyright law in the cause of "harmonization" with the
intellectual property norms of other nations, reinforced by
reminders that only harmonization can protect us from being
haled before the World Trade Organization to justify the
peculiarities of our own regime.
The elegiac tone of the preceding passages is quite
intentional-but it may or may not be justified. Even as we
celebrate the adoption of the world's first-ever copyright statute
three centuries ago this year, our duty to those joining in the
celebration vicariously through these pages is to be accurate,
informed, clear, insightful, and at least occasionally provocative.
We need to acknowledge, too, the possibility that our own
attachment to many of the old ways of U.S. copyright law, so
many of them derived so directly from Anne's landmark
legislation, may be a matter of mere sentimentality or
antiquarian taste. Perhaps, after all, the changes that have been
underway since the mid-1960s, and which seem likely to continue
beyond the 2010 celebrations, will prove to have been all for the
good-or, at least, inevitable in the great scheme of history. And
yet ...
We should not forget that the law of copyright, particularly
as it has been developed in the United States from its English
antecedents, has made a remarkable contribution to the
development not only of the U.S. economy, but of American culture
and freedoms as well. In particular, the profound alliance between
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment-stretching from
the idealexpression dichotomy to our broadly formulated
principle of fair use, with deference throughout to the concept of
a vital public domain-affords to at least parts of traditional U.S.
copyright law a deep and abiding appeal. In a world increasingly
linked by a system of commerce of which the United States has
5. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106 (effective July 1, 1891) (amended 1909).
6. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853 (effective Mar. 1, 1989) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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been the principal proponent-a world in which America's
political and cultural ideas likewise have continued (despite
occasional missteps) to gain adherents-it is perhaps not too
much to hope that the modest republican virtues of our copyright
law may yet survive.
As a reawakened Rip Van Winkle might remind us from his
knowledge of U.S. history, copyright's long record of carefully
calibrated encouragement for learning requires no resort to
jingoism to justify its continuance. American copyright law,
whatever its failings, has played an indisputably central role in
making the United States today the world's preeminent creator
and exporter of intangible information products. We would
suggest that copyright has been able to play this role precisely
because of, rather than in spite of, its doctrinal and theoretical
peculiarities-and, specifically, because of its success over time
in balancing proprietary rights and public access. Through the
process of successive approximation which is the special genius of
a common law system, the United States has managed to
negotiate a course between overprotection and underprotection,
and to strike at least a rough balance between the social interest
in securing capital investment, on the one hand, and encouraging
both innovation and free expression, on the other. Perhaps, in
years to come, we will be able to recalibrate that balance without
overcompensating. If not, perhaps the entailed consequences of
our collective failure to do so will make us wish eventually that
we had left well enough alone.
At the end of the day-and of this year of celebration-what
should we make of the trends and tendencies according to which
copyright law is being remade from its ancient antecedents? The
truest answer is also the ultimate proverbial cop-out: Only time
will tell. Whatever may lie beyond the horizon for this venerable
body of law, the challenge for those of us vitally interested in its
sound further development-whether as teachers, scholars,
practitioners, or judges-is to help educate, with an eye to
lessons learned, the new generation of copyright lawyers who will
shape that law in the post-tricentennial period. Our plea is a
simple one. In the pursuit of rationalization and harmonization
with cognate laws of other lands, let us not be too ready to discard
whatever may remain of the unique traditions of Anglo-American
copyright law. After all, they may yet come in handy.

